This is #14 in Osprey's 'Battle Orders' series and covers the Japanese Army operations from mid-1942 through 1943. As with others in this particular series, we don't get into the meat of battles per se, but we do get a full coverage of the strategy of the period.

This part of the war in the Pacific was one of transition where the Japanese were thwarted from their expansion of the early part of the war and put on the defensive, a position that was not well liked or understood by Japanese military planners. The result was a lot of hard lessons learned, lessons that would never be fully absorbed into the psyche of the Japanese military.

As in other books of this type, we are given insights into the combat mission, the various unit organizations, doctrine and tactics, weapons and equipment, and C-3 and intelligence. All of this provides an excellent background into how the Japanese Army thought and operated. It also shows us that they were not as well equipped as many modern armies and had some real logistical problems to overcome.

A goodly portion of the book is taken up by various combat operations in Guadalcanal, New Georgia, Bougainville, Eastern New Guinea and Northeast New Guinea. We see how these operations were conducted and the lessons learned as a result.

The author provides a general chronology of the time as well as a very complete bibliography to close out this book.

Overall, it is an excellent look into the 'why and wherefore' of Japanese thinking and gives us a good look at what went well and what went wrong. A book that any student of the Pacific War should have on their shelves.

November 2005

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