Osprey's The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989

Author:

Gregory Fremont-Barnes

Publisher/Distributor

Osprey Publishing

Price

$20.95 MSRP

Reviewer:

Scott Van Aken

Notes: 96 pages, 7¼ x 9¼ inches, softcover
ISBN:978-1-84908-805-3

There is an old saying that often times, history repeats itself and never has that been more true of the area in the world where Afghanistan is located. In many ways, Afghanistan is a crossroads nation where trade routes converge carrying goods to and from India and even into China on one side, the now Middle East on to Africa and Europe on the other.

This is an area where clan loyalties, religious fanaticism, and corruption seem to be the overwhelming way of life. It is true in many nations of the area that used to be called the Near East. They just cannot be explained by European or American (neither North or South) standards. It just does not work. World powers from the British to the US and the Soviets have found this out to their chagrin, loss of life and waste of money.

It was during one of the major power struggles of the 1970s that the Soviets saw an opportunity to bring Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere of influence. It was not their plan to conquer the nation, just to make it Soviet friendly so that it would act as a buffer to other nations in the area and help to spread the communist revolution.

Trouble was, other than a few corrupt politicians, the people of Afghanistan just did not care. They had no interest in the glorious revolution, did not want to be part of collective farming, did not care about getting rid of hierarchy and very much did not want to change the way things were. This was especially true of their religion, the way women were treated, and the importance of their clan leaders.

The British learned this in their decades long war in the late 1800s/early 1900s, the US is learning this today, and the Soviets learned this in the 1980s during their decade long conflict. About all the Soviets did was to make things worse and allow the Taliban to take control of the country where they cruelly and harshly put their idea of religious rule into practice.

The Soviets did quite a few things wrong but there were two biggies. First of all, they did not understand how to suppress guerilla fighters. They were trained for a standard, European conflict with a specific front line where overwhelming firepower won the day. This did not work against the Afghans as they did not play by the rules. They ran from overwhelming firepower as they had nothing to use against it and instead used tactics any American serviceman who has fought in Afghanistan will recognize. If the Soviets came into a place and destroyed it, the Mujahedeen simply returned after they left.

Secondly, they did not provide a large enough force to be able to quell the Mujahedeen and put forces into place to hold territory. Add to it that most Soviet soldiers were conscripts who did not have the fortitude for the fight and did not want to be there and you can see why the Soviets failed. Just like other Western powers who came into Afghanistan.

The author does a superb job of telling the story of the Soviet-Afghan war. He covers how it was in Afghanistan before the Soviets became interested, how the Soviets poured money and resources into trying to make Afghanistan another communist country, how it failed, how the military was sent in, what they dealt with and how they tried to change things. It seems very familiar. They also failed.

It is a fascinating look into a culture few truly understand and it shows what went wrong and why. An excellent read that anyone with even a passing interest in the subject will want to read. Chock full of photos and maps, it is highly recommended.

March 2010

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