Osprey's Chindit vs Japanese Infantry

Next in Osprey's Combat series is this interesting offering that compares the Chindits with Japanese Infantry in Burma during 1943/44. This is actually a pretty good matchup as both forces had to battle the environment as much as they did each other.

The Chindits were the brain-child of Orde Wingate, who championed the use of Long Range Group (LRG) operations and tactics. This worked well in Palestine and in the Egyptian/Libyan desert earlier in the war and there was no reason to think this wouldn't be useful in Burma. Basically, the ideal was for groups to be self sufficient and to operate behind enemy lines for a period of time, taking along everything they needed. The earlier operations were relatively short, lasting a few weeks at most.

This time, it was recommended to send in larger groups and to keep them supplied while in the field by air. It was a relatively radical idea and was not popular with most of the brass in the British Army, but it was thought to be well worth the effort by the British commander in the area, Archibald Wavell. In this scenario, division sized formations would be sent behind the lines to interrupt the Japanese lines of communiction and supply, thereby relieving pressure on Chinese and Indian troops holding the Japanese at bay in the northern and northeastern sections of the front.

An initial go was made in early 1943 and proved to be relatively successful. A much larger operation that not only lasted months but allowed the building of airstrips and 'strongpoints' where the Chindits could receive supplies, remove wounded and get replacements was undertaken in early 1944. This operation went somewhat contrary to the plan as the idea of LRGs was hit and run, while the 1944 operation had a major defensive requirement. However, it was also fairly successful and while the losses on both sides were somewhat high, it managed to perform its task of weaking Japanese forces in Burma.

While the Chindits were not exactly living in luxury, the Japanese were in worse condition. Troops in Burma knew they would not get any relief. No reinforcements, a barely functioning supply chain and continued attrition from combat and disease, worked against the Japanese in Burma. This was further exacerbated by typical poor Japanese tactics. Over and over again during the Pacific war, the Japanese used the same tactics, somehow hoping and repeating failed plans would eventually lead to success. They threw units into battle piece-meal and frequently used frontal assaults instead of the enveloping tactics that were so successful in the early years of the war.

In this book, we look at the background, training and tactics of both sides at this time. We see the strengths and weaknesses of both sides and get a chance to read about the progress of the fight and how the soldiers on both side fought during the battles. It is this look into the make-up of the two armies and how they put their training to work that really is the heart of this series. We learn from their actions what worked well and what did not. We see what these men went through and how the battles affected them and their comrades. The book covers three major actions. Nankan Station during March of 1943, Pagoda Hill in March of 1944 and Mougang during September of 1944 show the results of the deterioration of Japanese troops as the lack of replacements and supplies wreaks havoc with what, in 1942, was a superbly efficient force. It also shows that the concept of operating behind the lines had its down side during prolonged operations.

The book is superbly written and has some very compelling period photos and superb art work that only enhance what is a well done book. It is a book that draws in the reader and gives him a sense of what it was like. A book I fully enjoyed reading and can quite easily recommend to you.