Osprey's Sicily 1943

Once the Germans were driven out of North Africa, there was some concern as to just where to go next. Several options were on the table such as Corsica, which would allow air operations against southern France and the Italian mainland, though the ranges would be a bit much. Sicily was considered as well though it had the down side of being rather well defended by both German and Italian troops so a landing would not be easy. There was also some thought of going through the 'back door' in Greece or the Balkans. Hitler felt that Greece was going to be the main target, while Kesselring, who was in charge of German forces in Italy, thought that Sicily would be the place. All of this was not coming at a good time as Hitler was planning the Kursk offensive for the Summer of 1943 and any of those areas would delay things (which is just what happened).

The Allies decided on Sicily. Eisenhower was the overall general in charge while the general in charge of combat operations was Alexander. Alexander was one of those who laid out a general plan and then let his subcommanders work out the details. He was not much of a 'hands on' general and this led to the two other generals, Patton and Montgomery, pretty much doing what they wanted to reach the goals set. The importance of having Eisenhower and Alexander head things is that they were able to smooth out the rough spots that often happen in joint operations, for this was the first major joint operation between the British and American forces.

Like all warfare, there is a first time for things and in the case of Sicily, in addition to it being a first joint operation, it was also the first time that major paratroop drops were to be used. These were pretty much a disaster as the troops were scattered about all over the place and never really were able to form into a cohesive fighting force. It did not help that they had to fly around the invasion fleet for fear of having the planes shot down by Allied gunners. However, this is also just what happened with a goodly percentage of the force being eliminated by friendly fire. The plus side of the scattered drops is that it confused the defenders into thinking that there were more paratroops on the ground than what was really there. However, they also completed only about 25% of their objectives.

There should be some mention of the political situation. The Italians were seriously considering leaving the war, but did not want the country taken over by Germans in an effort to stop the Allies. The Germans knew that the Italians were running out of fight and were doing what they could to be in control of the situation. It was a rather delicate game that was being played. The result was that most Italian infantry did not put up the sort of fight that was expected. This was of course, not entirely true, but it was to the most part. Where the Italians fought just as tenaciously as the Germans was with the artillery units. They were just as motivated as the Germans and put up a very good account of themselves.

Montgomery chose the 'short' route up the east coast of Italy and left most of the rest of the island to the Americans. Montgomery wanted to be the first to Messina and to cut off the retreat route to the mainland. Patton also wanted to be first, but he took the longer way going through Palermo first then over the northern coastal route. When he ran into blocks, for Sicily's geography very much favored the defenders, he skipped past those defenders with amphibious landings.

In the end, the campaign went on longer than the Allies had anticipated. Kesselring did a superb job of holding them up and eventually allows much of the Italian and German army to escape with much of their equipment, across the Straits of Messina into mainland Italy, allowing the Germans to fight another day. The US Army did beat the British into Messina, but only by a few hours. There was much finger-pointing on why the enemy forces were allowed to escape so easily, but in the end, that is just what happened. For a first joint operation, it pointed out areas that worked and those that needed improvement, something that would help a great deal in the later Normandy landings.

Overall, it is a fascinating read of this important operation and one that I can easily recommend to you.

February 2013

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